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FILED 
. 
,cmmzs SAN MATEO COUNTY 
, 3:12, JUL 16 2018 
1266293 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 
SIX4THREE LLC, Case No. CIV533328 
Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) DENYING DEFENDANT 
FACEBOOK, INC.'S SPECIAL MOTION 
vs. TO STRIKE; (2) GRANTING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL 
FACEBOOK INC., et a1. MOTION TO STRIKE; (3) CONTINUING 
- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 
Defendants. DISCOVERY (CODE CIV. PROC. 
§ 425.16, SUBD. (G)) AND DEFENDANT ZUCKERBERG AND ANCILLARY 
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE 
DEMURRERS TO THE FIFTH 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Assigned for All Purposes to 
Hon. V. Raymond Swope, Dept. 23 
Date: July 2, 2018 
Time: 9:00 a.m. 
Dept: 23 
Action Filed: April 10, 2015 
Defendant FACEBOOK, INC.'s Special Motion to Strike, Plaintiff SIX4THREE, LLC'S 
Motion for Order That Certain Discovery Proceed Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 
425.16, subdivision (g), Defendants MARK ZUCKERBERG, CHRISTOPHER COX, JAVIER 
OLIVAN, SAMUEL LESSIN, MICHAEL VERNAL, and ILYA SUKHAR'S Special Motion to 
Strike, Defendant MARK ZUCKERBERG'S Demurrer to the'Fiﬁh Amended Complaint, and 
Defendants CHRISTOPHER COX, JAVIER OLIVAN, SAMUEL LESSIN, MICHAEL VERNAL, 
and ILYA SUKHAR'S Demurrer to the Fifth Amended Complaint came on for hearing on July 2, 
2018 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 23 of this Court before the Honorable V. Raymond Swope. Sonal 
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Mehta, Joshua Lerner and Laura Miller of Durie Tangri and Natalie Naugle of Facebook, Inc. 
appeared for Defendants. David Godkin of Bimbaum & Godkin and Stuart Gross of Gross & Klein 
appeared for Plaintiff. 
Upon due consideration of the briefs and evidence presented, and the oral argument of 
counsel for the parties, and having taken the matter under submission, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s Special Motion to Strike 
Defendant Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook") Special Motion to Strike and For Attorney's Fees 
and Costs Pursuant to C.C.P. § 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP) ("Facebook's motion") to the Fourth Amended 
Complaint, ﬁled on November 21, 2017, is DENIED as untimely. 
This motion was heard on January 9, 2018 and continued in order for, inter alia, the Supreme 
Court to resolve a split in authority regarding the issue of timeliness in moving to strike an amended 
pleading pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 ("§ 425.16") by granting review of 
Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207. 
(See CMC Order no. 12, ﬁled Jan. 18, 2018, 11 2, Ex. 2, p. 73:22-26.) The Supreme Court held, 
Because the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to resolve these lawsuits early, but not 
to permit the abuse that delayed motions to strike might entail, we conclude, as did 
the Court of Appeal, that, subject to the trial court’s discretion under section 425.16, 
subdivision (f), to permit late ﬁling, a defendant must move to strike a cause of action 
within 60 days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action. 
(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 639— 
640 (emphasis added) ("Newport Harbor") (afﬁrming the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
disapproving of Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Ca1.App.4th 298, "to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this opinion").) In light of the Supreme Court's decision, the Court ordered the 
parties to ﬁle supplemental brieﬁng on the effect of Newport Harbor on Facebook’s pending motion. 
(CMC Order no. 15, ﬁled May 30, 2018, 11 2.) 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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Having considered the Supreme Court's decision in Newport Harbor and reviewed the 
supplemental briefs of Facebook and Plaintiff Six4Three, LLC ("Plaintiff"), each ﬁled on May 3, 
2018, the Court ﬁnds Facebook's motion is untimely. 
As a threshold matter, Facebook does not argue that any cause of action appeared for the 
ﬁrst time in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and it therefore had no earlier opportunity to bring this 
motion. Instead, Facebook requests the Court exercise its discretionary relief to consider this motion 
on the merits. Facebook is correct that the Court has discretion to permit a late motion. 
(§ 425.16, subd. (f). See Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 645; Hearing Transcript, p. 7:15- 
20, 10:16 — 11:8.) 
Although the parties have each requested that the Court rule on Facebook's motion on the 
merits (Hearing Transcript, p. 35:20 — 36:5, 36:21-3726, 38:24-26), the Court exercises its discretion 
in denying hearing this late motion on the merits. 
The overarching objective of the anti—SLAPP statute is to prevent and deter lawsuits 
chilling speech and petition rights. Because these meritless lawsuits seek to deplete 
the defendant's energy and drain his or her resources, the Legislature sought to 
prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without great cost to the SLAPP target. 
Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the 
merits of the lawsuit using a summary judgment—like procedure at an early stage of 
the litigation. . . . A late anti—SLAPP motion cannot fulfill the statutory purpose if it 
is not brought until after the parties have incurred substantial expense. 
(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1188 (emphasis added) 
(internal citations, quotations omitted).) 
Facebook gives no compelling reason for its failure to ﬁle this motion earlier when the causes 
of action at issue appeared in the three previous iterations of Plaintiffs complaint. Facebook's 
argument that it complied "with the only precedential decision available at the time of ﬁling," Y u v. 
Signet Bank/Virginia, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at 315 ("Yu"), is not well taken. (Facebook Supp. 
Brief, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p. 1:6-7 ("Facebook Supp.").) 
"An anti—SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of 
claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, 
unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit." (San Diegans for Open 
Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 625-626.) To 
minimize this problem, section 425.16, subdivision (f), should be interpreted to 
permit an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it could not have been 
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brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions that could have been brought earlier 
(subject to the trial court's discretion to permit a late motion). This interpretation 
maximizes the possibility the anti-SLAPP statute will fulﬁll its purpose while 
reducing the potential for abuse. 
(Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 645.) F acebook's own argument demonstrates that it should 
have moved to strike earlier "to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation." (Newport Harbor, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at 645.) 
To begin with, Six4Three is now on its sixth complaint. Each amendment has 
brought with it substantially new and ever—expanding allegations, with all of the 
new allegations incorporated by reference into each of Six4Three’s causes of action. 
See Fifth Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 1111 177, 195, 207, 244, 266, 282, 291, 307. 
Along the windy path that this case has followed, Judge Alsup—who required 
Six4Three to ﬁnally drop its federal claims—stated, "determining the nature of 
Six4Three’s case . . . was like nailing jelly to the wall." 
(Facebook Supp, p. 2:8—13 (emphasis added).) 
This action was ﬁled over three years ago on April 10, 2015. (Complaint, filed Apr. 10, 
2015.) That complaint provided the grounds upon which Facebook now moves to strike, where 
Plaintiff alleged, "Graph API allows Developers, with the consent of a Facebook user, to read data 
from and write data to Facebook," which "allowed Developers to build applications that enabled a 
Facebook user to search the user's friends photos via a Facebook platform application," including 
the "Friends' Photos Endpoint." (Complaint, 1111 l6, 19, 20.) Facebook's decision to "end third-party 
access to the Friends' Photos Endpoint" forms the bases of the four causes of action pled. (Id. at 11 
39. See also id. at 11 52.) 
In the instant motion, Facebook argues, inter alia, that granting or denying access to its API, 
and specifically access to photos, is akin to an editorial decision subject to § 425.16. 
Facebook made — and needs to continue to make — editorial decisions about what 
third-party content is available through its Platform to protect its users’ experience. 
To that end, on April 30, 2015, one year after it gave app developers notice of the 
pending change, Facebook elected to not publish via its Platform APls content that 
an app user’s friends had shared with the user on Facebook. As a result, Pikinis could 
no longer access friends’ photos via the Facebook Platform. (Pikinis is ﬂee to seek 
direct permission from its users’ friends to access and analyze their photos). 
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Six4Three’s claims, all of which fault Facebook for deciding to ale—publish friends’ 
photos and other third—party content, fall squarely within the anti-SLAPP statute 
because each implicates Facebook’s conduct in furtherance of its constitutional right 
to free speech on issues of public concern. Each of the eight causes of action 
challenges Facebook’s editorial decisions about What third-party content to allow or 
not allow to be disseminated to third-party app developers through its Platform, and 
F acebook’s public statements regarding those decisions. - 
(MPA ISO Facebook's Motion, p. 1:20 — 2:2 (original emphasis).) 
Facebook's argument that the theories of the case were evolving or a moving target and thus 
there was no delay on F acebook's part is not well taken. (Hearing Transcript, p. 11:18—24, 12:15- 
17, 13:7 14:3, 17:17 — 18:1.) Speciﬁcally, Facebook's argument that "the way [Plaintiffs] framed 
the Complaint, . . . it was not clear that that's what they were pointing to" is belied by correspondence 
F acebook sent to Plaintiff approximately six weeks after the action was ﬁled. (Id. at p. 17:12-14.) 
In a letter dated May 26, 2015, Facebook clearly identiﬁed it believed the Complaint fell within the 
ambit of § 425.16 and requested Plaintiff dismiss this action based on, inter alia, that ground. 
Based on these facts and Six4three’s failure to support any of its claims, it appears 
that Six4three’s lawsuit is frivolous and nothing more than an attempt to chill 
Facebook’s valid exercise of its free speech rights to set reasonable parameters 
around permissible speech on its services. Accordingly, should Six4three choose to 
proceed with this lawsuit, Facebook intends to seek its attorneys’ fees and costs 
incurred in connection with bringing an Anti-SLAPP motion challenging the lawsuit, 
along with any other available remedies. 
(Godkin Supp. Dec. ISO Pl. Supp., ﬁled Jan. 24, 2018, Ex. A, p. 2 (emphasis added). See Hearing 
Transcript, p. 2728—14.) The Court notes that Facebook did not object to this letter or provide rebuttal 
argument. (See CMC Order no. 12, 1] 3; Facebook Reply Supp., ﬁled Mar. 7, 2018.) For reasons 
unknown, F acebook made the decision to not go forward with its stated course of action of ﬁling 
this motion when Plaintiff did not dismiss this action. 
Facebook failed to provide a cognizable reason for why it did not specially move to strike, 
especially when it attacked the pleadings at each iteration with its: (1) Demurrer to the Complaint, 
ﬁled on September 8, 2015; (2) Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, ﬁled on December 23, 
2015; (3) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, ﬁled on April 8, 2016; and (4) Demurrer to 
the Third Amended Complaint, ﬁled on August 18, 2017. 
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Facebook even moved for summary adjudication of the ﬁrst, second, and eighth causes of 
action of the Third Amended Complaint before ﬁling this motion. (Facebook's Notice of Motion 
and Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues, ﬁled Jul. 31, 2017, p. 1:11-22. See CMC Order 
no. 11.) Facebook could have brought this motion at the outset of this action in order to stop the 
"substantially new and ever—expanding allegations" (Facebook Supp., p. 2:8-10) from occurring 
in accordance with § 425.16's purpose "to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of 
the lawsuit." (Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 645 (internal citations, quotations omitted).) 
Furthermore, prior to this action’s complex designation, the parties engaged in a number of 
discovery disputes where they moved for relief from the Court, including: ( 1) Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Further Responses heard on September 8, 2016; (2) Plaintiffs Motion for a Protective Order 
heard on October 13, 2016; (3) F acebook's Motion for Protective Order heard October 13, 2016; 
(4) F acebook's Motion for Protective Order heard on December 5, 2016; (5) Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Further Responses heard on December 7, 2016; (6) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further 
Responses heard on December 3, 2016; (7) F acebook's Motion to Compel Further Responses heard 
on December 15, 2016; (8) Facebook's Motion to Compel Further Responses heard on April 12, 
2017; and (9) Facebook's Motion for Sanctions heard on April 20, 2017. 
This pattern continued after the complex designation on May 1, 2017 and prior to the 
discovery stay imposed by the filing of Facebook's motion on November 21, 2017. (See CMC Order 
nos. 2 — 6; Order After In Camera Review, issued Jul. 10, 2017; Order on Facebook's Motion to 
Compel Third Party Communications, issued Jul. 12, 2017; Order on Facebook's Motion to Compel 
Production of Withheld Scaramellino Communications, issued Jul. 14, 2017; Order on F acebook's 
Motion to Compel Production of Withheld Scaramellino Communications, issued Aug. 4, 2017.) 
To the extent that the same or similar issues are raised by the Individual Defendants in their 
anti-SLAPP motion, F acebook's arguments of judicial economy and preservation of resources are 
not well taken in light of the extensive and active litigation over the past three years. (See Facebook 
Supp., p. 325-8, 3:28 — 4:2.) 
' 
Facebook's argument that prejudice will result to the individual defendants "by forcing them 
to either participate in discovery (contrary to the dictates of Section 425.16) or waive their rights to" 
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is not well taken. (Facebook Supp., p. 4:14—16.) Facebook concedes, "Given the substantial overlap 
in the allegations, there is simply no way to continue discovery as to Facebook without the 
participation of the individual defendants." (Id. at p. 4:8-10.) Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had not 
named the individual defendants, this action would still have required their participation, in some 
form, in discovery. Facebook's decision to wait approximately two and one-half years to ﬁle this 
motion until the Fourth Amended Complaint is the sole reason for the purported prejudice now faced 
by the individual defendants. 
Similar to the ﬁndings by the trial court in Newport Harbor, the Court exercises its discretion 
to deny Facebook's "late ﬁling, [as] much litigation, including discovery, ha[s] already been 
conducted for [approximately two and one-half] years before the anti-SLAPP motion brought it to 
a halt. It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulﬁll its purpose of resolving the case promptly 
and inexpensively," especially in light of Facebook’s acknowledgment that § 425.16 applied to the 
Complaint and its decision at the outset not to ﬁle this motion. (Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at 645.) 
2. Individual Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike 
Defendants Mark Zuckerberg, Christopher Cox, Javier Olivan, Samuel Lessin, Michael 
Vernal, and Ilya Sukhar's (collectively "Individual Defendants" or "Defendants") Special Motion to 
Strike and For Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to C.C.P. § 425.16 (Anti—SLAPP) ("Defendants‘ 
motion") is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16.) 
§ 425.16 employs a two-prong approach, where the initial burden falls on the defendant to 
show the cause of action involves protected activity, and if successful, the shifting burden falls on 
the plaintiff to demonstrate the probability of success on the merits. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. 
Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (Rutter, Jun. 2018 Update) 11 7:500 ("Weil & Brown").) 
Section 425.16 posits instead a two-step process for determining Whether an action 
is a SLAPP. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold 
showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (§ 
425 .16, subd. (b)(l).) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act 
underlying the plaintiffs cause ﬁts one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, 
subdivision (6)” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 
1043). If the court ﬁnds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine 
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whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 
425.16, subd. (b)(l); see generally Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.) 
As we previously have observed, in order to establish the requisite probability of 
prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(l)), the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and 
substantiated a legally sufﬁcient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & 
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 (Briggs), quoting Rosenthal v. Great 
Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 (Rosenthal).) “Put another 
way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate *89 that the complaint is both legally sufﬁcient 
and supported by a sufﬁcient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, 
Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 
40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) 
Only a cause of action that satisﬁes both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—Le, that 
arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a 
SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. 
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88—89.) 
a. Timeliness 
As a threshold matter, Defendants' motion is timely pursuant to Newport Harbor. (See 
Corrected Opp. to Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 18, 2018, p. 1:5 ("Opp.").) Defendants were ﬁrst 
added to this action with the ﬁling of the Fifth Amended Complaint and issuance of the amended 
summons on January 12, 2018. Since they were not parties to the action in the prior iterations of the 
complaint, Defendants had no earlier opportunity to move to strike. (NeWport Harbor, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at 640 ("a defendant must move to strike a cause of action within 60 days of service of the 
earliest complaint that contains that cause of action").) 
Plaintiffs reliance on Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. at oral argument is 
not well taken as it is not analogous to the instant action. (See Hearing Transcript, p. 33:8—16.) That 
action involved the issue of "privity for purposes of claim preclusion between a licensee and a 
licensor" and not a special motion to strike. (Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. 
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 663, 674.) 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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b. First Prong — "Arising From Protected Activity" 
Defendants have met their initial burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff‘s claims arise from 
Defendants' exercise of free speech as deﬁned by § 425.16. In evaluating whether the conduct 
involves protected activity, 
We look for the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff‘s cause of action. We do 
not evaluate the ﬁrst prong of the anti-SLAPP test solely through the lens of a 
plaintiff‘s cause of action. The critical consideration is what the cause of action is 
based on. 
(Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 465 
(internal quotations, citations omitted) ("Hecimovich").) 
In this instance, Defendants move to strike "on the ground that the Fifth Amended Complaint 
("operative complaint" or "5AC) "arises from the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech 
in connection with an issue of public interest" pursuant to § 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Defendants' 
Notice of Motion, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p. i:9.) 
As argued by Defendants, the gravamen of the operative complaint is that Plaintiff "was 
harmed by F acebook’s editorial decision, allegedly made and implemented by the Individual 
Defendants, to de-publish certain categories of user-created content, including friends’ photos and 
other content" by means of its API. (MPA ISO Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p. 2:25—27.) 
The Court notes that Plaintiff does not argue in opposition that any of the claims against Defendants 
are unprotected activity. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) 
The allegations of the Fifth Amended Complaint demonstrate the alleged conduct involves 
the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. 
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia,: (1) Facebook Developer Platform, including the Graph API, "is one of 
the world's largest software economies globally and the economic activity it generates is larger than 
the GDP of many sovereign nations" (SAC, 11 34); (2) Plaintiff and Facebook entered into an 
agreement providing, inter alia, third party user photos and videos (id. at 1111 93, 97); (3) "[t]he App 
enabled Facebook users to reduce time spent searching through their photos by automatically ﬁnding 
summer photos that their friends have shared with them through Facebook's network, assuming their 
ﬁiends permitted [Plaintiff] to access the photos" (id. at 11 104); (4) "[i]f a photo were removed by 
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Facebook for containing objectionable content, it would have [sic] simultaneously and automatically 
been removed from the App" (id. at 1] 106); (and 5) "its decision to close access to the Graph API 
Data also arose from the fact that Facebook made public representations around its management of 
user data that enticed tens of thousands of companies to build businesses . . ." (id. at 11 237). 
Accordingly, the Court ﬁnds the Fifth Amended Complaint arises out of the constitutional right of 
free speech in connection with an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 
In opposition, Plaintiff has not offered any contrary argument or cited to evidence, but rather 
incorporates arguments and citations to evidence in its opposition and supplemental brieﬁng to 
Facebook's motion. 
Plaintiff incorporates the arguments raised in its oppositions to Facebook’s Anti- 
SLAPP Motion, including the applicability of the commercial speech exemption of 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(c) and the unprecedented untimeliness in asserting the 
Anti-SLAPP argument. 
(Opp. to Defendants' motion, ﬁled May 17, 2018, p. 1:3-5.) In footnote no. 1, Plaintiff enumerates 
the ﬁlings it incorporates by reference. 
Plaintiff‘s Opposition to Facebook’s Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) ﬁled on 
December 12, 2017, Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition to Facebook’s Special 
Motion to Strike (Prong 1) ﬁled on January 24, 2018, Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant’s 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion (Prong I) ﬁled on 
March 7, 2018, and Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Special Motions to Strike (Newport Harbor) ﬁled on May 3, 2018. 
(Opp, p. 1:22—25, fn. 1.) Although this incorporation is provided under the section titled "The 
Commercial Speech Exemption Applies," Plaintiff does not limit incorporation to the commercial 
speech exemption, but incorporates all arguments raised in these prior ﬁlings. (Id. at p. 123—5) 
Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support incorporation of arguments raised in Other 
motions. (Hearing Transcript, p. 5521-9. See Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, 
Slatkz'n & Berns (1992) 7 Ca1.App.4th 27, 35, superseded by statute on other grounds in Union Bank 
v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583 ("A point which is merely suggested by a party's counsel, 
with no supporting argument or authority, is deemed to be without foundation and requires no 
discussion").) Although the Court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing 
afﬁdavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based," in ruling on an anti-SLAPP 
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motion, that does not include considering arguments raised in opposition to a different motion as 
"[t]he pleadings are the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for 
the judgment of the Court." (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 420, 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) 
Furthermore, incorporation of these arguments violates the 15-page limit. (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 3.1113(d).) Plaintiffs Opposition is 15 pages long. Incorporating these ﬁlings adds over 
37 pages of additional arguments as: (1) Plaintiffs opposition to Facebook's anti-SLAPP motion is 
15-pages long. (Opp. to F acebook's Motion, ﬁled Dec. 12, 2017); (2) Plaintiffs supplemental brief 
on the issue of commercial speech is over nine pages long (Pl. Supp. Brief, ﬁled Jan. 24, 2018); (3) 
Plaintiffs reply to Facebook's supplemental brief on the issue of commercial speech is over 9 pages 
long (Pl. Reply Supp. Brief, ﬁled Mar. 7, 2018); and (4) Plaintiffs supplemental brief on the effect 
of NewPort Harbor is over 4 pages long. (Pl. Supp. Brief, ﬁled May 3, 2018). 
Plaintiffs reliance on California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(d) is inapposite. (Pl. Opp. to 
Def. Evid. Object, ﬁled Jun. 21, 2018, p. 3:9—15.) That court rule pertains to the incorporation of 
evidence, not argument. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 923.1; Roth v. Plikaytz's (2017) 15 
Cal.App.5th 283, 291.) 
Notably, prior to ﬁling its opposition, Plaintiff did not seek leave to ﬁle a longer 
memorandum. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(e). See Hearing Transcript, p. 56:12 — 57:7. ) "A 
memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be ﬁled and considered in the same 
manner as a late-ﬁled paper." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(g).) "[T]he court in its discretion 
may refuse to consider it in ruling on the motion." (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 9:64.17.) 
Plaintiffs failure to address the ﬁrst prong, including the issue of commercial speech, is 
particularly surprising in light of the hearing on Facebook's motion on January 9, 2018. 
In its opposition to Facebook's motion, Plaintiff failed to address the issue of commercial 
speech. (See Opp. to Facebook's motion, ﬁled Dec. 12,2017.) At the hearing, the Court found that 
both parties failed toaddress the issue of commercial speech and the applicability of Demetriades 
v. Yelp, and continued the hearing for supplemental brieﬁng on those two issues. (CMC Order no. 
12, 1111 2, 3. See Godkin Reply Dec. ISO Plaintiff Reply Supp. Brief, ﬁled Mar. 7, 2018, Ex. A, p. 
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36:19-26; Miller Dec. ISO Facebook Supp. Brief, ﬁled Feb. 16, 2018, Ex. 11, p. 66:8-15, 67:9—12.) 
Speciﬁcally, 
The parties failed to adequately brief and address the issue of (a) whether the 
Defendant’s conduct which is the basis of Plaintiff‘s claims constitutes "commercial 
speech" under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.l7(c), and thus is exempt from 
any SLAPP motion to strike under Section 425.16; and (b) failed to reference or 
discuss the case of Demetriades v. Yelp (2014) 228 Ca1.App.4th 294 (which includes 
discussion of commercial speech under SLAPP and the assertion of preemption or 
statutory protection under the Communications Decency Act (as argued by 
Defendant). On or before February 16, 20128, each side shall ﬁle and serve a 
Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities addressing these legal issues, 
not to exceed ten pages of text. Each side may ﬁle and serve a Supplemental 
Response Memorandum of Points and Authorities, in response to the opposing 
party’s supplemental brief, on or before March 7, 2018. 
(CMC Order no. 12, 11 3.) 
Based on the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider the 
incorporated brieﬁng as part of Plaintiffs opposition or to permit Plaintiff to ﬁle a page compliant 
opposition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3 .1 1 l3(g).) Accordingly, Defendants have met their initial 
burden of proof on the ﬁrst prong. 
c. Second Prong —— "Probability of Prevailing on the Merits" 
Since Defendants have met their initial burden on the ﬁrst prong, the burden shifts to Plaintiff 
to demonstrate the probability of prevailing on the merits. 
While plaintiffs burden may not be "high," he must demonstrate that his claim is 
legally sufﬁcient. (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 93.) And the plaintiff 
must show that it is supported by a sufﬁcient prima facie showing, one made with 
"competent and admissible evidence." (T uchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. 
San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 1219, 1236; Evans v. Unkow 
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497.) 
(Hecimovich, supra, 203 Ca1.App.4th at 469 (parallel citations omitted).) 
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to address Facebook's moving argument that it is 
immune from these causes of action pursuant to the Communications Decency Act. (Reply ISO 
Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 1:15-16, 2:20 — 3 :9. See MPA ISO Defendants' Motion, 
p. 8:1 — 11:10.) 
/ / / 
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Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” The statute goes on to provide that causes of action 
inconsistent with it under state law are precluded: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with 
this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” (§ 230(c)(3), 
italics added.) 
(Delﬁno v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 802 (original emphasis).) 
The statute requires dismissal of state law claims if: 
— defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service; 
— the information for which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is information 
provided by another content provider; and — the complaint seeks to hold defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of that 
information. [Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc. (ND CA 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1056, 
1 065] 
(Wiseman, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Trial Claims & Def. (Rutter, Oct. 2017 Update) 1] 4:480.) 
As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers 
of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third 
parties.” [Citation] Section 230 was enacted to “protect[ ] websites from liability for 
material posted on the website by someone else.” [Citation] Specifically, section 230 
states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 23 0(c)( 1). Importantly, section 23 0'3 “grant of immunity 
applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an ‘information 
content provider,’ which is deﬁned as someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of the offending content.” [Citation] CDA 
immunity, thus, does not apply to “the creation of content” by a website. [Citation] 
Because a “website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider,” 
it “may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but 
be subject to liability for other content.” [Citation] 
(Perkins v. Linkedin Corp. (N .D. Cal. 2014) 53 F .Supp.3d 1222, 1246—1247.) 
Section 23 0(c)(1) thus immunizes providers of interactive computer services (service 
providers) and their users from causes of action asserted by persons alleging harm 
caused by content provided by a third party. This form of immunity requires (1) the 
defendant be a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of 
action treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the 
information at issue be provided by another information content provider. 
(Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830.) 
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The CDA is an affirmative defense. (Pirozzi v. Apple Inc. (N .D. Cal. 2012) 913 F .Supp.2d 
840, 848—849 (distinguished on other grounds in Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Company (N .D. Cal., 
Oct. 10, 2013, No. C 13-02477 WHA) 2013 WL 5594717, at *3; La ParkLa Brea A LLC v. Airbnb, 
Inc. (CD. Cal. 2017) 285 F.Supp.3d 1097, 1103).) 
There is some dispute in the case law as to which party bears the burden of proof 
on an affirmative defense in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion. Some cases state 
that “although section 425.16 places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its 
claims, a defendant that advances an afﬁrmative defense to such claims properly 
bears the burden of proof on the defense. [Citation.]” (E.g., Peregrine Funding, Inc. 
v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676.) 
Others suggest that the [afﬁrmative defense] presents “ ‘a substantive defense a 
plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. [Citations.]’ 
[Citation.]” (E. g., F eldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 
1467, 1485.) 
(Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 683.) In this instance, the inquiry appears clear as 
Plaintiff failed to raise any argument or cite to any legal authority or evidence to demonstrate the 
CDA does not apply. 
Accordingly, it is undisputed that Facebook is an internet service provider. (See Cross v. 
Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 197 ("the court noted it was undisputed that Facebook 
is an ' "interactive computer service" ' ") ("Cross"); MPA ISO Defendants' Motion, p. 8:26 — 9:18.) 
It is undisputed that the information at issue is third party user content. (See id. at p. 9:19-24.) It is 
undisputed that Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants based on Facebook's role as a publisher 
of content. (See id. at p. 9:25 — 11:2.) And it is undisputed this action pertains to Plaintiffs access 
to user content as published by Defendant. 
In order to demonstrate the probability of success on the merits, that burden requires Plaintiff 
to address Defendants' argument of CDA immunity as to each cause of action. As Plaintiff has 
raised no contrary argument, that issue is waived. (See Khan v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 705 
Fed.Appx. 631.) 
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden of proof on the second prong. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
-14- 
ORDER RE: SPECIAL MOTIONS TO STRIKE, DISCOVERY (CCP § 425 .16(G)) AND DEMURRERS
A 
\IONUI 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
d. Other Considerations 
The Court notes this action appears to include both protected and unprotected activity 
stemming from Facebook's treatment of third party user content as a commodity, as well as, 
Facebook's representations of access to that commodity to developers for apps. 
In this respect, Facebook could arguably be "engaged in the business of selling or leasing 
goods or services" and the commercial speech exemption might apply. (Code Civ. Proc § 425.17, 
subd. (0). But see Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 203 (user could not claim 
exemption under § 425.17 since "Facebook sells advertising, it is not 'primarily engaged in the 
business of selling or leasing goods or services" and "Facebook offers a free service to its users") 
Here, Cross appears distinguishable, as Plaintiff is not a user, but a developer. In that respect, this 
action appears to more closely resemble Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294 
("Demetriades"), as previously pointed out by the Court in regards to Facebook's motion. 
However, Plaintiff failed to proffer any contrary argument or cite to any legal authority or 
evidence on the issues of commercial speech and immunity under CDA. 
First, as to the issue of commercial speech, Facebook's representations of the access to 
published user content to developers to create apps to generate user engagement and revenue streams 
appears to be commercial speech. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 7:891 ("Defendant's statements 
on its website about its own operations (how it filters reviews posted by the public on its website), 
as distinct from the content of the reviews themselves, are commercial speech and exempt from the 
anti-SLAPP statute").) However, it is Plaintiff‘s burden of proof. "[T]he burden is on the plaintiff 
to show that an exemption of section 425.17 applies." (Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at 308. 
See also Weil & Brown, supra, ﬂ 7:900 ("burden of proving applicability of the commercial speech 
exemption falls on the party seeking to invoke it").) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate the activity is commercial speech. 
Second, as to the issue of immunity under CDA, in Demetriades, the Court found the CDA 
did not apply because "[n]owhere does plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the statements 
of third parties (i.e., reviewers) on its Web site. Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own 
statements regarding the accuracy of its ﬁlter." (Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at 313 
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(emphasis added).) Although Demetriades may apply, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to 
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, given its failure to address the issue of CDA 
immunity in opposition, or to otherwise proffer any argument as to the applicability of Demetriades. 
(See Hearing Transcript, p. 56:24 — 57:2.) This abject failure to address this issue is perplexing given 
the supplemental brieﬁng ordered by Court in Facebook's motion as well as the extensive argument 
on this immunity proffered in Defendants' motion. (CMC Order no. 12, 11 3; MFA ISO Defendants' 
Motion, p. 1:21-25, 8:1 — 11:10.)
‘ 
Third, to the extent that this action may arise out of both protected activity (i.e. publishing 
and depublishing user content) and unprotected activity (i.e. Facebook's policies and representations 
regarding developer access to user content to develop apps), Plaintiff fails to argue or identify that 
any part of the causes of action arises out of unprotected activity. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 376, 396.) Accordingly, this issue is waived. (See Khan v. Sessions, supra, 705 Fed.Appx. 
at 631.) 
Fourth, Plaintiff does not argue whether there is any distinction to be made between 
Facebook's publishing of user content to developers via Graph API and Facebook's publishing of 
user content to users via its website or mobile app. 
Had Plaintiff properly addressed the foregoing in its opposition, Defendants' motion may 
have ended in a different result. However, that is not before the Court. 
e. Requests for Judicial Notice / Objections 
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Godkin Declaration, ﬁled May 
17, 2018, as to: (1) Exhibit nos. 1 — 27 (statements and representations published by Facebook); 
(2) Exhibit nos. 29, 33, 34 (FTC Statements); (3) Exhibit nos. 37 — 45 (Facebook press releases), 
(4) Exhibit no. 52, 53, 56, 58 — 60, 62, 66, 67 (Facebook keynote, Defendant Zuckerberg interviews); 
(5) Exhibit nos. 55, 57, 63 — 65, 68 — 71, 177 (Facebook ﬁnancial reports, earning calls); (6) Exhibit 
nos. 83, 146 (Facebook web pages); (6) Exhibit no. 207 (statute); and (7) Exhibit nos. 210, 211 
(appellate opinions); (8) Exhibit no. 219 (Facebook SRR) (See CMC Order no. 7, p. 2.) 
The Court GRANTS, but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein, Plaintiffs Request 
for Judicial Notice of: (1) Exhibit nos. 28, 30 — 35, 174 (FTC press releases, complaint and exhibits, 
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letters to commenters); (2) Exhibit nos. 36, 46, 54, 61, 72 - 82, 84 - 145, 147 — 173, 175, 176, 178 
— 198, 200 (news articles, opinions, editorials); (3) Exhibit no. 199 (United Kingdom Parliament 
press release); and (4) Exhibit nos. 201 — 206, 208, 209, 211 - 218 (this action's ﬁlings, orders, 
records and transcripts). 
The Court DENIES Plaintiff‘s Request for Judicial Notice of: (1) Exhibit nos. 48 — 51 (third 
party press releases/ earnings reports); and (2) Fact nos. 1 — 7 pertaining to the December 2012 SRR 
(Pl. Req. Jud. Notice, p. 16:15 — 17:13, 27:1 — 28:2). 
The Court DENIES Defendants‘ request to require Plaintiff seek leave of the court before 
requesting judicial notice in the future. (Opp. to P1. Jud. Notice, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 2:6-14.) 
The Court DENIES Defendants' request to strike the declaration of David Godkin as 
improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 1005, subd. (b).) See Defendants' Evid. Object. to P1. Opp. to 
Defendants‘ Motion, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 1:1 — 2:23 ("Defendants' Objections").) 
The Court OVERRULES Defendants' Objections nos. 1 — 70. The quoted language 
Defendants object to is from the arguments raised in Plaintiffs opposition, and not the evidence. To 
the extent that Defendants object to the string citations, those objections are OVERRULED; 
however, Plaintiff is admonished that citations to evidence must be speciﬁc. (Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 3.1113(k).) To the extent that Defendants object to the exhibits, each in their entirety, those 
objections are OVERRULED. Separately ﬁled objection should state: (1) "the language verbatim to 
which objection is made;" (2) "the page and line number and document where such language 
appears;" and (3) "the legal ground for objection with the same speciﬁcity as would be required at 
trial." (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 9:102.6. See, e.g., Defendants' Objections, p. 5:5 -6:3.) 
a. Attorney Fees and Costs 
As the prevailing defendants, Individual Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
and costs as to this motion only. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a 
prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or 
her attorney's fees and costs. If the court ﬁnds that a special motion to strike is 
frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant 
to Section 128.5. 
(§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The exceptions enumerated in paragraph (2) do not apply in the instant 
action. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(2).) "[L]egislative history shows it was intended to allow only fees and 
costs incurred on the motion to strike (not the entire litigation)" (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 7:1135. 
See Hearing Transcript, p.11213—17 (Facebook conceding fees are limited to the motion, and not the 
entire litigation).) "[A]lthough the statute does not expressly so provide, it is interpreted to allow 
awards of only such fees as the court deems reasonable." (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 721138.) 
Individual Defendants may, inter alia, ﬁle a motion for attorney fees and costs. (Weil & 
Brown, supra, at 11 7:1185.) "Under rule 3.1702(b) of the California Rules of Court, a motion seeking 
fees following an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion must be served and ﬁled within the time 
limits for ﬁling a notice of appeal." (Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 
531, 545.) 
3. Discovery Stay (§ 425.16, subd. (g)) 
With the Court's ruling on F acebook's motion and Defendants' motion, there are no further 
outstanding special motions to strike. The discovery stay is lifted. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / ./ 
/ / / 
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4. Plaintiff's Discovery Motion (§ 425.16, subd. (g)) and Demurrers 
Plaintiff‘s Motion for Order That Certain Discovery Proceed Pursuant to Cal. Code. Civ. 
Proc. § 425.16(g) and for Sanctions, ﬁled December 13, 2017 and Defendant Zuckerberg and 
Ancillary Defendants demurrers to the Fifth Amended Complaint, each ﬁled May 3, 2018, are 
continued to August 3, 2018 at 9 am in Department 23. (See Hearing Transcript, p. 4:19-20.) 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 13, 2018 
Honora 16 V. Raymond Swope 
Judge of the Superior Court 
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